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Abstract
The hopes regarding the positive impact of the Internet and digital participation in civic society have faded in recent years.
The digital realm is now increasingly discussed regarding its role in putting democracy in jeopardy and polarizing public
debate by propagating extremist views and falsehoods. Likewise, the perception of so-called alternative media as benefi-
cial carriers of counter-public spheres and as important complements to mainstream positions in social debate has flipped.
Alternativemedia are nowoften associatedwith the “Wickedweb” of disinformation, political populism, or even radicaliza-
tion. Following Quandt’s (2018) notion of ‘dark participation’ and Phillips and Milner’s (2017) description of the Internet
as ambivalent, this article asks, whether the same holds true for the users of alternative media: a segment of the audi-
ence traditionally discussed in terms of community, engagement, participation, and strong ideological identification with
progressive political causes. Do users of ‘dark’ alternative media bond with their media in similar ways to constitute com-
munities of darkness? Based on interviews with 35 users of alternative media from a left-leaning, right-wing, Russian-tied
and/or conspiracy spectrum users, uses of alternative media are pictured as grey rather than black or white. The find-
ings illuminate the ambivalences within alternative media users as audiences and communities. Ambivalences are found
regarding the use of alternative sources as audience or community members, regarding a shared attitude of criticality and
anti-systemness, which connects trans-medially and trans-ideologically, as well as the experienced comfort of community,
which can become a main motivation for use.
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1. Introduction: Into Darkness
The tide has turned. The high hopes regarding the pos-
itive impact of the Internet and digital participation in
civic society have faded over the last couple of years.
We do live in times ‘after the hype’ (Kaun & Uldam,
2017) and optimistic aspirations that democracy would
be enhanced by the blooming of social movements and
digital media activism, allegedly enabled by the Internet,
have sobered. The digital realm is now increasingly dis-
cussed in terms of its role in putting democracy in jeop-
ardy and polarizing public debate by propagating extrem-
ist views and falsehoods. The dark side of digital media
technologies is that they can also be means of suppres-
sion rather than tools for empowerment (Treré, 2016).
Likewise, the perception of so-called alternative media
as beneficial carriers of counter-public spheres giving
voice to minority positions and critique as important cor-
rectives to mainstream positions in social debate has
flipped. Previously romanticized oases of voice and delib-
eration providing a fresh breeze for democratic progress
are now suspected to represent foul swamps of disinfor-
mation ecologies, vile tools for political agitation, or even
drivers of radicalization.
But with alternative media now increasingly being
discussed in the nexus of populist or extremist politics
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(Holt, 2020) and regarding political agitation, disinfor-
mation dissemination, and its allowing propaganda to
bypass the checks and balances of professional jour-
nalism, what does this reveal about their audiences?
Traditionally, these users—a gravely under-researched
and hardly known species—have been discussed in
terms of community, engagement, participation, and
their high levels of identification with alternative media
products. When alternative media are considered tools
for ill intent, does this suggest that their users are shroud-
ed by darkness? And do they knowingly or unknowingly
support vile causes through their participation? This arti-
cle investigates the users, user communities, and usage
of alternativemedia to better comprehend their relation-
ship with sinister goals and anti-democratic tendencies.
Quandt (2018, p. 44) when proposing his concept of
‘dark participation’ emphasized that although there “is
a large variety of participation behaviours that are evil,
malevolent, and destructive,” the future of digital com-
munication “is not all doom and gloom,” as the past was
not all bright. By “adding some black to the pearly-white
idealism of citizen engagement” (Quandt, 2018, p. 37) in
digital contexts, one “might end upwith amore appropri-
ate grey,” instead of the high hopes or sombre sorrows
concerning the digital realm’s role for democracy and
communication. Other authors have also contributed
to the “deconstruction of earlier, naïve ideas” (Quandt,
2018, p. 37) regarding the web as a happy place for the
betterment of society. Phillips (2015) argues that malig-
nant online practices, e.g., trolling, widely condemned
as obscene and deviant, are not that deviant but must
be understood as integral elements of digital culture,
supported and nourished by a responsive environment.
In this sense, practices may arguably be offensive, weird
or obscene, but they are ‘normal’ and a characteristic
of the online ecosystem nonetheless. Phillips and Milner
(2017, p. 5) describe the Internet as ambivalent, and
argue that digital communication practices can be “simul-
taneously antagonistic and social, creative and disruptive,
humorous and barbed, [and hence] are too unwieldy,
too variable across specific cases, to be essentialized as
this as opposed to that.” Considering digital culture as
ambivalent “collapses and complicates binaries within
a given tradition” (Phillips & Milner, 2017, p. 11), e.g.,
between alternative and mainstream, abhorrent and
admirable, odd and normal, light and dark participation.
In order to approach users and user communities
around alternative media, the article first provides a
glimpse at the rich history of competing understandings
of alternative media and impeding characteristics and
features. This is followed by addressing the profound
lack of research into the audiences and users of alterna-
tive media and discussing the little knowledge we have
about it. Then, the findings of an exploratory and theory-
generating interview study with users of “dark alterna-
tive media” are presented. The results aim to highlight
that the users of alternativemedia cannot simply be clas-
sified based on the orientation or content of the plat-
forms they tend to use, rather, their motives, practices,
and identification with the alternative media are varied
and ambivalent.
2. Alternative Media and Their Respective
Mainstreams
There is a lot of ‘conceptual confusion’ (Holt, 2020)
around the notion of alternative media, and we can
look back on decades of rich debate on what consti-
tutes alternative media and in how far they pose alter-
natives to exactly what. “Endless discussions about its
key features and practices” (Hájek & Carpentier, 2015,
p. 365) in academia have reinforced a conceptual bina-
ry between alternatives and their respectivemainstream
counterparts. The notion of ‘alternative’ implies that it
must be a complementary, substitutional, additional, or
simply different version to something else. As Holt, Ustad
Figenschou, and Frischlich (2019) have described, the
active positioning of so-called alternative media vis-à-vis
an alleged mainstream is a key dimension for approach-
ing and understanding alternative news media. Instead,
this juxtaposition is also crucial for identity management
and self-perception of (some) alternative media outlets,
which feast on their status as a corrective or even as
being an explicit opposition to themainstream, including
purportedly one-sided or incomplete representations of
social reality proposed by legacy media (Figenschou &
Ihlebæk, 2019; Holt, 2019). Furthermore, nurturing such
a collocation of alternative and mainstream as opposing
blocks, can also contribute to essentializing either side
as uniform and suggest homogeneity and negate actual
diversity and pluralism in the discussed area.
To help dissolve the binary between mainstream
and alternative and find a more nuanced and sensi-
tive understanding of the notion, Downing (2001) pre-
ferred to speak of alternative media with a dedicated
political agenda as radical media. He described such
radical media as being “generally small-scale and com-
ing in many different forms, but with the common
characteristic of presenting, proposing and providing
alternative visions to hegemonic policies, priorities and
perspectives’’ (Downing, 2001, pp. v). While Downing
foregrounded the political and ‘resistance potential,’
Atton (2002) in his take, emphasized a broader under-
standing of their transformative potential as a key char-
acteristic of radical alternative media. The transforma-
tive potential can also extend beyond more narrow polit-
ical contexts. Also, Fuchs has emphasized the potential
of alternative media to resist and reform, when he mod-
elled them as critical media (Fuchs, 2010). For Fuchs,
alternative media as critical media question domina-
tion, express the positions of the oppressed, and dis-
pute “for the advancement of a co-operative society”
(Fuchs, 2010). Alternative media has traditionally been
seen as associated with the progressive left and some-
what idealized by scholarship (Holt et al., 2019). This
development was historically consistent with the hopes
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and expectations regarding the democratic potential of
digital participatory culture of the coming Internet.
‘Alternative media in the service of repression’
(Downing, 2001), on the contrary, were rather sidelined
or neglected. While their existence and perilous poten-
tial were acknowledged, they mostly remained out of
focus, and ‘rebellious media,’ fighting for more positive-
ly perceived causes in the reform of culture and society
were brought to the mainstage of scholarship. In recent
years, this has (slightly) changed and the other alterna-
tives (Atton, 2006), typically depicted as darker alterna-
tives to their positive counterparts, becamemore promi-
nent in research (Haller, Holt, & de la Brosse, 2019).
These darker alternatives are alternative media, which
are often described as linked to political extremes, most-
ly far-right populism (Holt, 2019), to conspiracy theo-
rists, or having ties to Russia. Instead of a potential, they
are regarded as a peril for democracy and this recent
research on alternative media has emphasized their role
in the spread of disinformation and as drivers of politi-
cal polarization or even radicalization. Studies on alter-
native media are hence likely to actually speak of very
diverse phenomena using a similar vocabulary. Some
authors such as Hájek and Carpentier (2015) hence advo-
cate that media theory should better protect the ‘alter-
native media signifier’ against being too widely applied,
lest it also be applied to those who have simply claimed
the alternative label for themselves andwhodonotmeet
the requirements and features to be defined as such.
The apparent diversity of alternative media and the
many versions of what they can be alternatives to sug-
gest considering alternative and mainstream as a shift-
ing continuum rather than absolute categories (Holt
et al., 2019; Kenix, 2011; Rauch, 2016). For instance,
based on her analysis of audience’s understandings of
the mainstream alternative dialectic, Rauch (2015) has
described—similar to others (e.g., Atton, 2002)—how
being an alternative can either relate to the product or
the process. She speaks of organizational alternatives
(for instance amateurism vs. professionalism, commer-
cialism vs. non-commercial orientation) or of content
alternatives (offering other views, other topics, voic-
ing critique). With changing media landscapes, chang-
ing political systems, and evolving public debates, what
is alternative at one point can become mainstream and
vice versa (Kenix, 2011, p. 17). Holt et al. (2019) argue
that alternative and mainstream hence must be inter-
preted as strictly contextual and relational. Speaking of
alternative or mainstream then only makes sense ‘in
regard to’ something:
By considering alternative news media as an “alter-
native” and “in regard” to—allows to put them into
context. It accommodates alternative news media
inspired by diverse political (left as well as right
wing), religious (e.g., fundamentalist or extreme lib-
eral) or philosophical (e.g., animal rights) ideologies
that outspokenly describe themselves as counter-
hegemonic correctives to mainstream newsmedia or
are described as such by their audience or third par-
ties. (Holt et al., 2019, p. 866)
I will follow this relational understanding and focus on
such alternative media, typically regarded as dark alter-
natives, which are alternative regarding their political
position and characterized by what Holt (2018) speaks of
as anti-systemness. These alternativemedia outlets posi-
tion themselves as opposed to the alleged mainstream
media, which are regarded as representatives of the sys-
tem and hence accomplices to the political establish-
ment, distorting or concealing reality for their interest
(and against the manipulated people). Such a kind of
anti-systemness, combined with an anti-elitist and anti-
establishment attitude has also been identified as a char-
acteristic feature of populism (Krämer, 2018; Mazzoleni,
2008). Anti-systemness, however, is not necessarily pop-
ulist, and traditionally alternative media as carriers of
counter-public spheres have also featured this stance.
Like alternativemedia, counter-public spheres (Fenton &
Downey, 2003) also have a history of being romanticized
in media and communication scholarship as inherently
progressive and pro-democratic.
The anti-system stance supports the idea that alter-
native media platforms can blend well with populist pol-
itics and provide mutual sustenance (Holt, 2020). These
media “do not have to follow commercial logic, journalis-
tic conventions, or ethical principles: they can be as rad-
ical and polemical as they wish” (Noppari, Hiltunen, &
Ahva, 2019, p. 26). A lack of commercial orientation has
traditionally been seen as a characteristic of alternative
media. However, not following journalistic conventions
and being highly polemic and polarizing as well as par-
tisan can also be part of a flourishing business model.
Right-wing platforms such as Breitbart and InfoWars
in the US; the Austrian unzensuriert, and the German
KenFM espouse their alternative (political) views with
ideological as well as financial interests.
Additionally, alternative media platforms can be
attractive for users susceptible to political populism.
For instance, studies have shown that alternative media
are strongly featured and referenced in the (socialmedia)
communication by populist political actors (Bachl, 2018).
Several studies have found similar strong links and mutu-
al referencing between alternative media platforms and
populist political parties or populist politicians (Haller &
Holt, 2019). Yet, while new alternative media in the dig-
ital realm can cater to problematic causes and help pur-
sue darker political goals, this cannot automatically be
assumed for their users. The audience and users of alter-
native media remain widely unknown.
3. In Search of the Virtually Unknown—The Audiences
and Users of Alternative Media
17 years ago, Downing (2003, p. 625) argued that there
was “a distinctly disturbing gulf between our currently
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fragmentary knowledge or debates concerning how audi-
ences and readers use alternative media” in comparison
to “the mass of descriptions and theorizations of alter-
native media,” their potential impact and their role for
social movements or in critical counter-public spheres.
Back then, he described the research into audiences and
usage of the myriad and ever-growing numbers and out-
lets within the alternative media spectrum as a “mini-
mally developed” area of research. The “virtual absence”
(Downing, 2003, p. 626) of audiences and users has since
not changed drastically and audiences still remain the
neglected foster child of research into alternative media.
For instance, among the 50 chapters in the Routledge
Companion to Alternative and Community Media (Atton,
2015), not one is specifically dedicated to the audience
of alternative news media. There is, however, a section
on the communities and identities, which form around
the practices of producing, contributing to, and being
part of an alternative news media cosmos. Especially
with alternative media associated with or linked to par-
ticular social movements, people in the vicinity of alter-
native media are regarded as part of distinct or amor-
phic activist groups constituting ‘interpretive communi-
ties’ (Rauch, 2007), rather than news audiences. But the
people who are served by and use alternative media,
mostly remain out of the picture.
Especially regarding the users of the aforementioned
darker alternatives, Noppari et al. (2019, p. 24) note
that their users “have stereotypically been labelled as
misguided and as having insufficient media literacy.”
The authors further see such characterizations as being
mostly based on assumptions, as little empirical research
has been done on users (and producers) of such media
offerings. One of the rare exceptions is provided by
Müller and Schulz (2019, p. 3)who also describe research
on the users of alternative media as “scarce.” In their
own take on the audiences of “alternative media with an
affinity for populism,” Müller and Schulz (2019) focused
on political attitudes and patterns ofmedia use as predic-
tors for the likeliness of exposure to alternative media.
While they differentiated between occasional and fre-
quent, recurring users of alternative media, details of
howpeoplemake use of alternative sources and how this
might play out in their media use or media repertoire
over time, were not under scrutiny.
A study that looked more closely into the how and
why of using alternative media platforms, or as they call
them ‘counter-media,’ was presented by Noppari et al.
(2019). Based on their interviews with users of Finnish
right-wing alternative media platforms, they distinguish
three different types of users. According to them, sys-
tem sceptics, as a first type, can be described as soci-
etal outsiders, with strong political or ideological beliefs.
This type of users shows high hopes into the counter-
public sphere in which they actively participate and hope
for a change of the system. They often actively support
the alternative media they consume or try to share their
views on their own social media profiles. Instead of being
generally sceptical, the distrust and scepticism of the sec-
ond type, agenda critics, was aimed at specific topics, in
which they believed legacy media would push its own
particular agenda and be hostile to their personal opin-
ions. This type of user would share alternative media
content and often belong to social media groups around
them. For the first and second type, active contribution
and associationwith the alternativemedia they usewere
relevant. The third type, the casually discontent, are crit-
ical of certain journalists or topics and seek alternative
positions in alternative media but use them only sporad-
ically. They did not show ideological commitment to the
partisan alternativemedia but rather were characterized
by what the authors call savvy scepticism and constant
irony. A crucial takeaway from this study is that for dedi-
cated users, seeking contact to and comfort in a commu-
nity of likeminded people was fundamental. Antagonism
against legacymedia and their allegedly lopsided agenda
was a vital building block of community efforts.
Particularly in today’s high-choice digital media envi-
ronments, fresh contact and first-time exposure to
alternative media outlets can easily occur incidentally
and without further intention or attention of would-
be users. Due to algorithmic curation of content selec-
tion and content presentation, follow-up interaction can
become more likely after the initial contact with a par-
ticular source (O’Callaghan, Greene, Conway, Carthy, &
Cunningham, 2015). Initial contact can play a role in the
process of red pilling, i.e., making fresh contact with
alternative news media and then being attracted into a
sphere of increasingly extremist content. Red pilling, as
Marwick and Lewis (2017) describe, often begins with
contact to a content which appears attractive (a topic,
an idea they can identify with, or a style of presenta-
tion, e.g., dark humour) and eventually spreads from
there. However, people who occasionally have contact
with alternative media platforms are not automatically
drawn into a spiral of radicalization (Munn, 2019).
The argument that people who do distrust legacy
news media are likely to refrain from accessing alterna-
tive news sources and search for alternative and alleged-
ly independent sources has been supported by multiple
authors at different times (e.g., Jackob, 2010; Newman,
Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos, Levy, & Nielsen, 2018); albeit
with broad and diverse understandings of alternative
media. According to Leung and Lee (2014), using Social
Networking Sites for the purpose of news consumption is
strongly related to coming across alternative media and
being exposed to their content. Users in social media set-
tings often struggle to differentiate the trash from the
treasure and to identify the valuable or reliable sources
from the dubious (Edgerly, 2017; Schwarzenegger, 2020;
Tandoc et al., 2017); strategies of news authentication
or verification tend to be either unsuccessful or pursued
only until users’ pre-existing assumptions about a topic
are confirmed. In an exploratory study, Schwarzenegger
(2020) compared digital news navigation and informa-
tion verification strategies of users of alternative media
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with non-users. He found that users of alternativemedia,
in particular, made paradoxical calls for unbiased report-
ing and perceived legacymedia coverage as biased or not
neutral. They also thought highly of themselves as critical
thinkers and competent at detecting wrong information
as well as balancing the biases, when using alternative
media as complementary sources. While they typically
pictured themselves as sceptical against all sides, their
media practices revealed that they were highly selective
in their criticality and did not doubt alternative sources
in the same way as legacy media.
As mentioned above, the users of alternative media
are often rather discussed with regards to communi-
ty building and identity work (see respective chapters
in Atton, 2015) than in terms of audience research.
Alternative media, like other digital communities in gen-
eral, can become ideological touchstones for their users
and provide them with a sense of belonging and com-
munity (Rauch, 2007) which might have a particular
allure for those considered as ‘societal outsiders’ else-
where. While the foundation for this sense of belong-
ing can be found in ideological beliefs or coherent world-
views, the appeal of an online community can also be
based on shared practices or expectations. For instance,
Topinka (2018) described how users can sustain com-
munities based on their shared sense of a twisted and
somewhat abusive humour and the lustful breach of
societal taboos. In this trajectory users of alternative
media platforms can also find comfort by perceiving
themselves as members of (at least loosely connected)
collectives rather than being alone. Whether it is the
political direction of the content, the support of being
sceptical together, or the thrill of following something
that is deemed harmful in the public eye is an empiri-
cal question. The community perspective can be benefi-
cial for understanding what attracts users to alternative
media and howusers socialize and bond (both online and
offline) even if they do not fully identify with media ide-
ologically. But as Dagron (2007) has criticized, the image
of alternative media communication as small, isolated,
and pure forms of community communication does not
correspond to reality anymore, if it ever did. Following
Postill (2008), the dominant role of community as the
all-encompassing gaze on users of activist and alterna-
tive online media can obscure the fact that the uses can
be impure (Dagron, 2007) and ambivalent or casual and
incidental. Digitalization has supported an unprecedent-
ed increase in news media platforms, by legacy media
and alternative sources alike. In high-choice media envi-
ronments, alternativemedia can become part of amedia
repertoire without their users even being aware of or
giving weight to their alternativeness, as they encounter
them embedded in social media environments, as they
do with legacy media. In this sense, not assuming that
users of alternative media can be classified as a close
community of likeminded people, but discussing them in
terms of audiences, “as the people who, in their capac-
ity as social actors, are attending to, negotiating the
meaning of, and sometimes participating in the multi-
modal processes initiated or carried out by institutional
media” (Schrøder, 2019, p. 160). Audiences are typically
researched regarding theirmotives and criteria regarding
selection and interpretation of media and its contents.
Hence, applying an audience perspective on alternative
media users can help to unravel the granular motives
and uses as well as the ‘nuanced gratifications’ (Sundar
& Limperos, 2013) that can be found in the use of alter-
native media.
4. Method
This article is based on 35 guided interviewswith users of
alternative media. Alternative media titles were general-
ly differentiated as left-leaning, right-wing, Russian-tied,
or as belonging to the conspiracy/esoteric spectrum
based on previous research (e.g., Bachl, 2018; Schweiger,
2017) which guided the recruitment of participants.
Interviews were conducted with German, Austrian, and
Suisse alternative media users (aged 22 to 63) in 2019
by the author and a team of student assistants in
a research seminar; the analysis was performed by
the author alone. The interviews were semi-structured
and conversational, lasting between 43 and 113 min-
utes. Most interviews took place face-to-face, some via
Skype. With permission, each interview was digitally
recorded in its entirety and transcribed subsequently.
Pseudonyms have been used for quoted material to pro-
tect the privacy of participants. The recruitment pro-
cess for the study was organised in both consecutive
and parallel steps. First, a series of media outlets relat-
ed to the four different camps discussed here were
included based on the previous research, self-positioning
of the media, and public debate. The left-leaning out-
lets included NachDenkSeiten and Rubikon; the right-
wing outlets comprised, for example, Compact and
PI-News; the Russian-tied outlets contained, among oth-
ers, RT Deutsch and Sputnik News; and the outlets
belonging to the conspiracy/esoteric spectrumwere e.g.,
KenFM and kla.tv. In a second consecutive step, users
of these outlets were identified and contacted in two
ways: Student assistants in the research seminar func-
tioned as ‘mediators’ (Kristensen & Ravn, 2015), and
were asked if they knew someone who was a dedicat-
ed, visible, or self-declared user of the identified alter-
native media outlets. Additionally, active users on the
alternative media outlets’ social media sites were iden-
tified based on their online practices and participation
in the online comment sections and contacted via the
respective social media channels. This was difficult, as
the effort to make contact would often be filtered out,
simply not seen, or wilfully ignored. As a third and com-
plementary strategy, we followed a snowball principle
(Goodman, 2011), asking interview partners who were
already participating in the studywhether they could rec-
ommend other users they knew who might be interest-
ed in participating in the study. The final sample included
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users from different countries, which is rather an effect
of a shared German-speaking mediascape and transna-
tional connectivities among alternative media users. For
instance, RT and Sputnik in their German versions cater
to the different countries. Austrian right-wing alterna-
tive media find some resonance among German users
(e.g., unzensuriert,Wochenblick and Alles Roger), where-
as right-leaning German platforms are also used and
shared in the neighbouring countries. Subjects of the
interviews were: Participants’ general media use and
repertoires in the everyday now, and as remembered,
their media ideologies and media beliefs including trust
and criticism of themedia, and their political orientation.
Further, interviews addressed how the respondents ini-
tially came in contact with alternative media, and the
role played by alternative media outlets for them both
in their media repertoire and regarding their general
worldview and outlook on (political) issues. Of particular
importance in the interviews was the topic of commu-
nity participation. Hence interviews addressed the ques-
tion of how far and in which way respondents were par-
taking in community activities around alternative media
and in how far they perceived their online activities
as community-related. Data analysis followed a qualita-
tive content analysis coding-scheme and was supported
with QDA-Software f4-analysis. The analysis was guided
by the deductive categories reflected in the interview
guidelines (e.g., community participation, media ideolo-
gies and beliefs), which were applied to the material.
In the process of coding, these deductive categorieswere
inductively refined, and additional categories, as well
as new subcategories, were introduced whenever new
themes and issues emerged in the data. In the last step,
the material was coded once again with the final cod-
ing scheme and theses were formulated as a result of
the coding.
5. Findings: Users of Alternative Media beyond Dark
and Light
The findings of the study are organized in three theses,
each addressing a particular shade of grey and ambiva-
lence among the communities of users and audiences of
dark alternative media.
5.1. 1st Ambivalence: Sometimes Users are Just Users
and Rather Audience Members Than Community
Members
Users of alternative media—when addressed in
research—are typically discussed in terms of identifica-
tion and community. Following the study presented here,
this is important for some, but is far from being relevant
to all informants. On the contrary, users of all types of
alternative sources in the research spectrum expressed
that alternative media are one type of sources they turn
to, in order to complete their picture or add additional
layers to their information spectrum:
In my opinion, no address or source always reports
authentically and always brings the facts in the nec-
essary depth. In my opinion there is no such thing.
Instead, you have to get the information on the sub-
ject from diverse sources. (Ralf, 30)
The search for alternative viewpoints can be motivated
by distrust or scepticism towards legacy media. As in
previous research, the informants expressed that they
frequently find mainstream coverage to be incomplete,
biased, and omitting or concealing relevant aspects of
the issue, partially to fit their own agenda or, equally
important, for commercial interests. Besides political par-
tisanship, blatant sensationalism and poor reporting also
deter users. However, scepticism rarely turns into hostility
towards the media or reproaches of wilful manipulation.
Rather than being hostile media illiterates, some
of the informants display a rather sophisticated
understanding of affordances and challenges of news
reporting, e.g., time constraints for reporting and limited
capacities that demand selection of topics and perspec-
tives presented. Alternative media as news sources are
then sometimes sought out as the other part and com-
plementary voices, but without necessarily considering
this information more trustworthy or complete. Quite
the opposite, some of the users of RT or Sputnik argued
that they would, of course, consider these platforms
openly biased and driven by Russian agendas. However,
as users assumed to know what the biases are, they
thought they were able to balance or filter them on
reception. Additionally, other media were believed to
also carry biases, but in an obscured way. Similar obser-
vations could be made with right-wing media platforms,
which were sometimes seen as amplifiers of German
populist party AfD politics, but users would trust their
individual competence to cope with this partisanship.
Probably, this is an indicator of users overestimating
their capability to verify information and check sources.
An interesting example of the variety of uses and
motives that can result in recurrent consumption of
alternative media sources is represented by Sabrina, a
53-year-old flight attendant and avid user of right-wing
alternative media. She doesn’t identify with their polit-
ical views but recurrently frequents such platforms to
check out “what they are up to next” while often think-
ing “this must be bollocks.” Sabrina frequently engages
in online-discussions and aims to debunkmisinformation
and advocate for a civilized discourse among online users.
To this end, she wants to know what “the other camp”
is currently discussing and sharing, to brace herself for
arguments to expect and misinformation that is likely to
be referred to in debates. A similar practice could also
be observed in a different direction. Some media scep-
tical alternative users, with low levels of trust in lega-
cy media, would even intensify their use of public ser-
vice broadcasting news, to unravel “manipulations”: “It’s
not that what they show didn’t happen, but as soon as
the interpretative framing begins, when they move away
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from plain and simple reporting, there are other powers
and interests at play” (Anton, 43).
Although some users will buy into virtually every-
thing the alternative media offers and doubt the main-
stream positions with similar intensity, it was quite
common that also alternative media were handled with
care and distanced scepticism. Informants like electronic
engineering student Theodor expressed that they trust
legacy media overall, which constitute by far the largest
portion of their media diet. Yet, they garnish and com-
plement it with alternative news media. Still, the expec-
tation is that they will only occasionally find an opposing
(ideological) counterweight to the mainstream, rather
they access such sources for variation and nuance: “One
is not necessarily more balanced informed I would say,
but more varied….In any case, you get a larger overview,
which address others or concern others or something like
that” (Theodor, 26).
Some informants have rather sporadic contact with
particular alternative media titles, while others follow
them continuously as part of their media repertoires.
But, and this is important, some treat them as sources
among other sources, neither privileged nor condoned,
others rather trust legacy media and use alternative
sources for cross-referencing, while others rather believe
alternative sources and use them to check and challenge
mainstream reporting. Users do not necessarily identi-
fy with them but become a—frequently critical, amused,
and oppositional—audience.
5.2. 2nd Ambivalence: Alternative Media Users are
Diverse but Anti-Systemness Connects
Trans-Ideologically and Trans-Medially
Although informants were recruited based on their use
of at least one ‘dark’ alternative media title, the inter-
views demonstrate, that users hardly ever remained
exclusive users of just one platform. As they reported,
the share of alternative media they frequented grew
over time. This modification of the composition ofmedia
repertoires was partly furthered by digital recommender
systems but also following the personal recommenda-
tions of other users and online commentators. One infor-
mant explains:
It’s the thirst for knowledge, the curiosity, that stimu-
lates it and I think understanding. If I may go back to
the picture of the puzzle, the puzzle grows exponen-
tially. So it is growing, in comparison, if I only focus
on the mainstream media, then I might just have the
edge together…through the alternative media and
the mixture with the established media, but I also
manage to put the inner part together slowly and
leisurely and part by part. At least I am convinced of
that [laughing]. (Bettina, 38)
The example of Luise (59) demonstrates that the growth
of alternative newsmedia rarely follows a clear-cut politi-
cal agenda nor happens entrenched in ideologies or polit-
ical camps. Hence, classifying users as either left-wing
or right-wing sympathizers based on the particular plat-
forms they use is problematic. Luise’s initial contact with
alternative media was with rather esoteric titles, which
are also crosscutting (partially cloaked) right-wing narra-
tives. From there, her diet expanded via Facebook and
YouTube to include alternative media allocated to the
conspiracy and left-leaning spectrum. This pattern was
very common, with the committed users of right-wing
alternative media being least likely to expand beyond
their own segment and the left-leaning and conspir-
acy titles being most commonly part of a combined
diet. Luise’s user type represents an ideological bricoleur,
taking fragments of different ideological and political
camps as long as they fit an overall orientation of discon-
tent, anti-systemness, and critique. The platform KenFm,
regarded as a conspiracy platform, was popular with
users who would otherwise either prefer left-leaning or
right-wing platforms. Also, media with links to Russia
were popular across political orientations or did blend
with all other types of alternativemedia in the study. This
orientation-dominated use of alternative media outlets
became also apparent in users from different countries
who could relate to the anti-system reasoning provided
by the alternative media and transferred stances to their
own particular original political contexts.
In sum, the same alternative media platforms are
used by users with a variety of political and ideologi-
cal orientations and different motivations. At the same
time, users with highly different backgrounds and orien-
tations may pick their arguments and pieces of informa-
tion from the same or similar alternative media outlets.
This ideological flexibility was not limited to picking from
a wide array of ideologies from alternative media, lega-
cy media content, e.g., public broadcasting satire for-
mat Die Anstalt was also highly acclaimed for its anti-
systemness. These findings foster the importance of
media repertoire or media ecology perspectives, which
do not analyse particular platforms and their users in iso-
lation, but in a relational perspective, and with regard to
the use of other news sources, both legacy and alterna-
tive media.
Users of alternative media may cut across different
ideological areas and not belong to coherent communi-
ties around them, yet still have common attitudes and
features. Across all types of alternative media under
scrutiny users typically thought of themselves as being
very critical media users and critical thinkers in general,
better informed and more knowledgeable than regular
media audiences and their acquaintances:
Much more critical than others. I notice that in con-
versations with others. They are clearly less informed
than me, they have less general knowledge and yes,
but some of them don’t want to, they are less inter-
ested. I can say that quite clearly, I am obviouslymore
critical than the average. (Michael, 52)
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These third-person effects of users of alternative media,
who would consider themselves savvier and more com-
petent to identify disinformation arewell in line with pre-
vious research. Schwarzenegger (2020) has shown, how-
ever, that high confidence in one’s competence to make
sense of and assess the veracity of information does not
necessarily reflect actual skill but may keep users from
actively challenging information.
5.3. 3rd Ambivalence: The Comfort of Community Can
Outshine Ideologies, Bringing Light to the Darkness
So far, I have shown that users of dark alternative media
do not necessarily convert to a community. But there are
also cases in which the cosy experience of belonging and
sharing commonalities is crucial, and can become even
more important than the alternative news per se. The
comfort of not being alone in their scepticism, the feel-
ing of being understood by likeminded people and not
considered weirdos, loonies, or conspiracy theorists for
their divergent views—an imminent fear of some of the
informants—is an illuminating experience for users with-
in their alleged darkness:
You can discuss about everything and you are not
looked at crookedly if you have a different opinion
about the news from the traditional media. So that
you can exchange views and also say that what the
other media say is often nonsense. So that you also
know that others also recognize this and you are not
alone. (Felix, 30)
Some users expressed that they rather refrain from try-
ing to convince others of their alternative views or to
openly convert them. Partly, because they want to avoid
confrontation or objection, partly because ‘waking up’
is someone everyone needs to do on their own terms.
In this case, participants seek and find support, social
interaction, and validation in the social media commu-
nities built around alternative media outlets. The sig-
nificance of the community for individual users is best
illustrated by the case of 38-year-old Bettina. She is
an avid user of a platform which belongs to the con-
spiracy spectrum of the sample and is notorious for
its anti-systemness. Since Bettina started following this
platform and its YouTube channel, she also engaged in
their Facebook fan group. The group name indicates it
is open ‘for system critics’ only and Bettina since start-
ing out with a few user-comments she made it to the
rank of group administrator. Outside the web, Bettina
is a trans-woman. In the interview, she described that
since her transition and due to her current personal
situation—working lots of night shifts, being alone at
work and mostly alone during the days—for her, engag-
ing in online discussions and alternative media related
online groups is one of a few “chances to talk to peo-
ple.” Through her personal background, she is sensitive
regarding gender-related issues, which she thinks are
blatantly addressed badly in mainstream and alterna-
tive media alike. In the group, however, she only rarely
engages in discussion when “gender stuff” is addressed.
Bettina does not want to be “outed” in the group as
trans and does not want to endanger her status within
the group. At least occasionally, for Bettina, the sense of
community and belonging she experiences in the group
can outshine the ideology. The personal situation and
experience of Bettina is certainly exceptional. But her
case is nonetheless a focal glass for other informants’
experiences. Peaceful co-existence in like-mindedness is
also highlighted as an important community feature by
Luise and Marianne, who are also part of an alternative
media fan community on Facebook. “It is important that
we are on the same page, share similar viewpoints, are
on the same level. Neither too far to the left, nor to
the right” (Marianne, 62). However, while the demand
for non-radical and balanced positions was very com-
mon and positions too extreme were considered out of
place, it was the users of right-wing alternative media
in particular who would object to a qualification of the
media outlets they used as far-right, and would rather
reframe them as conservative or “how the common peo-
ple think.” Theywere hence generalizing and normalizing
the worldviews they found in these media. Communities
provided themwith an environment that helped imagine
right-wing worldviews as commonsensical.
6. Conclusions
Over the last couple of years, a growing interest in alter-
native media, especially those in the digital realm and
catering to an anti-system stance can be observed in
media and communication research. However, the noto-
riously “weak appetite for user research within alterna-
tive media” diagnosed by Downing (2003, p. 627) was
not stimulated in the same fashion as the general atten-
tion for alternative media has increased. This study set
out to generate an appetite for further investigative
research into audiences and users of allegedly dark alter-
native media and their communities of darkness.
The findings sketched here suggest that users of alter-
native media are not a homogenous lot: their practices,
motives, and orientations are more nuanced than sim-
ply aligning a populist media with a populist audience.
However, at this point, this study does not aim to provide
a renewed definition of the audience of the wide diver-
sity of platforms and outlets referred to as alternative
media. Instead, the empirical part of the study set out to
question some purported certainties and to advocate for
greater ambivalence when researching users of alterna-
tive media. Treré (2020) highlights the potential of recog-
nizing the ambivalent nature of digitalmedia and commu-
nication practices. According to him, this does not equal
simply acknowledging that technologies can be used for
the good or the bad. Instead, it means critically chart-
ing the social, cultural, and political conditions under
which certain kinds of media practices, technological
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appropriations, and media imaginaries were generated,
combined, and implemented by concrete individual and
collective actors in specific historical contexts. Thinking
of the users of alternative media as both audiences and
communities enable the highlighting and foregrounding
of particular moments of their engagement with the
media in their repertoire, which can be caused by not
only various but even contradictory impulses. At the
same time, it also prevents hasty universalism based on
an overemphasis or neglect of community aspects.
The three theses presented here aimed to illumi-
nate the ambivalences within alternative media audi-
ences and open avenues for future research. First, when
alternative media use is not necessarily linked to ideo-
logical identification and community participation, but
can simply be part of diversified media diets in high-
choice media environments, it is important to learn
more about the effect and long-term impact that the
use of alternative media can have for the composition
and interplay of media in media repertoires over time.
Second, the findings invite further investigation of the
commonalities and differences across alternative media
and users from different political camps and ideolo-
gies in trans-ideological and transmedial combinations.
The cross-references, entanglements, relations, interde-
pendencies, and mutual influences that the use of alter-
native media has on the media repertoire, the informa-
tion horizon, and political participation and orientation
can only be understood in the long run through a trans-
media or media ecology perspective.
This can help prevent claims of exceptionalism and
universalism alike. It further helps to understand the
potential problematic impact that alternative media and
their anti-systemness can have on public discourse at
large, beyond the sometimes irrelevant niches in which
they circulate and reinforce their positions (Holt, 2020).
At the same time, it can help deconstruct superficial
views of “pure” users, that qualify them according to
their assumed political ideologies, as conspiracy-loons
with insufficient media literacy or even prone for rad-
icalization based on an alleged impact the alternative
media may have on their users—an overemphasis of
effects and identification supported by the community
view, which would be considered an overcome position
in audience research. Third, the results suggest that the
role of belonging and community require further atten-
tion. Media literacy programs and initiatives which raise
awareness of the perils of online disinformation and
propaganda need take into account that fact-checking
and literacy can’t be effective antidotes when their side
effect would be the dissolution of users’ important per-
sonal social bonds.
As with every kind of self-reported data, one has
to be careful about particular elements of the users’
accounts. It would be naïve to simply take the self-
presentation as critical thinkers, well informed and open-
minded citizens equally wary against falsehoods from all
sides for granted. Further, it could be said that the find-
ings of this study are influenced by the sample compo-
sition. In all steps, the recruitment process was tedious
and not without setback: Besides a rather typical low
response rate when recruiting via social media, sever-
al people who were approached as potential partici-
pants declined for a variety of research-related reasons.
For instance, people feared that the findings would be
used to further discredit alternative media, which in the
view of some respondents were treated unfairly in pub-
lic debate. Another line of reasoning when declining to
participate can be explained by the anti-system stance
described above: University researchers would then be
seen as associated with the system if not even repre-
sentatives of what they saw themselves in opposition
to. A third line of decline was due to the EU’s General
Data Protection Regulation and the requirement to fill
in official University forms to express consent, as users
did not want to be associated and/or recorded in some
cases. In general, the responses of those who actively
declined the invitation to participate suggest that those
users who were especially highly entrenched in the ide-
ological camps behind the respective alternative media
and with a strong anti-systemness were likely not to par-
ticipate and hence rathermoderate usersmay have been
open to contributing to the study.
The lack of political hardliners, the absence of stub-
born ideologists and of incompetent media-illiterates
may signal too reflexive, too openminded, and too
few misguided, ill-informed views. However, there were
some of these negatives in the sample, and probably
even more so among the users who refused to partici-
pate in this study. But at the same time, this limitation
is also a main takeaway from the study. Users and uses
of alternativemedia are ambivalent, not a secluded com-
munity of darkness, but diverse peoplewith diverse back-
grounds andmotivations, who happen to use alternative
media as part of their media repertoires. They are nei-
ther black nor white. There is a whole lot of grey to dis-
cover around them.
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